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ABSTRACT
Wireless social community networks (WSCNs) is an emerg-
ing technology that operate in the unlicensed spectrum and
have been created as an alternative to cellular wireless net-
works for providing low-cost, high speed wireless data access
in urban areas. WSCNs is an upcoming idea that is start-
ing to gain attention amongst the civilian Internet users. By
using special WiFi routers that are provided by a social com-
munity network provider (SCNP), users can effectively share
their connection with the neighborhood in return for some
monthly monetary benefits. However, deployment maps of
existing WSCNs reflect their slow progress in capturing the
WiFi router market. In this paper, we look at a router
design and cost sharing problem in WSCNs to improve de-
ployment. We devise a simple to implement, successful1,
budget-balanced, ex-post efficient, and individually rational2
auction-based mechanism that generates the optimal num-
ber of features a router should have and allocates costs to
residential users in proportion to the feature benefits they
receive. Our problem is important to a new-entrant SCNP
when it wants to design its multi-feature routers with the
goal to popularize them and increase their deployment in
a residential locality. Our proposed mechanism accounts
for heterogeneous user preferences towards different router
features and comes up with the optimal (feature-set, user
costs) router blueprint that satisfies each user in a locality,
in turn motivating them to buy routers and thereby improve
deployment.
Keywords: wireless social community networks, multi-
feature routers, auction mechanism, cost-sharing
1. INTRODUCTION
The last few years has seen the rapid increase in demand
for high-speed wireless data services. These services that are
traditionally offered by cellular service providers operate in
the licensed band of the radio spectrum. The cellular ser-
vice providers guarantee high quality of service (QoS) and
good coverage but charge high prices to users due to their
substantial investments, both for deploying and maintain-
ing the network infrastructure, and for licensing the wireless
spectrum.
A low-cost, high-speed alternative called wireless social
community networks (WSCNs) has emerged in the last five
1a mechanism is successful if it achieves its intended pur-
pose. For example in this work, a successful mechanism
would help install routers in a locality
2a mechanism is individually rational if the benefit each
agent obtains is greater than its cost.
years for providing cheap and ubiquitous WiFi access to
users. These networks operate in unlicensed spectrum bands
and use WiFi access points that are operated and main-
tained by community members to provide data service. A
well-known example of a company that provides WSCN
services is FON (http://www.fon.com), which is a world-
wide WiFi community network funded by commercial orga-
nizations like Google, Skype, and Free (http://www.free.fr).
Users in a WSCN buy special multi-feature3 WiFi routers
from a social network community provider (SCNP) like FON
and share their bandwidth securely with other users around
their locality in return for some monthly monetary benefits.
FON members (Foneros) can freely access WiFi anywhere in
the world near a locality where FON members are present,
whereas non-FON members need to pay the SCNP for using
the bandwidth of a FON member. Thus, a WSCN provides
a platform for mobile and ubiquitous wireless access.
Although the promise shown by the wireless social net-
works is good, current deployment maps indicate that WSCNs
are yet to capture the WiFi router market, i.e., the router
deployment rate is quite slow. There could be multiple rea-
sons for such a trend: 1) users may not be well informed
about the technology, 2) they may be skeptical about the
monetary benefits earned in comparison to the services they
provide (bandwidth sharing), 3) there could be certain ISP
policies that could prevent the SCNP’s from widely market-
ing their routers4, and 4) common Internet users may just
be happy with their traditional ISP connection and may not
be bothered about sharing their WiFi with others. All the
above mentioned factors contribute to low router deploy-
ment and in turn reduce ubiquitous network coverage and
quality of service.
In this paper, we address a router design and cost sharing
problem in WSCNs. Our problem is important to a new-
entrant SCNP when it wants to design its multi-feature5
routers with the goal to popularize them and increase their
3Routers sold by FON act like a virtual PC. They can upload
video on YouTube, load photos on Picasa and Facebook,
can download Internet files and P2P data, etc., even when
the PC is off, have some special hardware components, etc.
Presently, these routers are priced in the range of 40 to 80
dollars per unit and can be purchased online from sites like
Amazon.
4Mobile Internet users may want to access WSCN band-
width and pay the SCNP instead of using a traditional In-
ternet service provider (ISP) connection. This may not be
acceptable to ISP’s for commercial profit reasons. Thus,
the SCNP’s and ISP’s may settle a contract that lays down
certain policies of operation.
5The features may be, both hardware and software in na-
deployment in a residential locality. Since the users in a
residential locality are heterogeneous in nature w.r.t feature
preferences, a feature may not be equally viable to two users
in a network. Thus, without any proper incentive mecha-
nism, it is quite likely that many features will not seem
important enough for users buy, and as a result the SCNP
may end up with a low deployment of their routers. We de-
vise a simple to implement, successful, budget-balanced, ex-
post efficient, and individually rational auction-based mech-
anism that generates the optimal number of features a router
should have, and allocates costs to residential users in pro-
portion to the feature benefits they receive. Our proposed
mechanism accounts for heterogeneous user preferences to-
wards different router features and comes up with the op-
timal (feature-set, user costs) router blueprint that satis-
fies each user in a locality, in turn motivating them to buy
routers and thereby improve deployment. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work of its kind in the area of
wireless social community networks.
Related Work: Research in wireless social community net-
works is relatively new. Efstathiou et.al propose a charging
model for wireless community networks using the concept
of user reciprocation [3]. In a recent series of works [5]
[6], Hubaux et.al., have devised static and dynamic pricing
strategies in WSCNs for reaching high network coverage.
They have also studied the evolution and market share of
WSCNs using non-cooperative game theory. The authors
observe that 1) the dynamics of the community depends on
initial coverage, the subscription fee, user preferences for
coverage, and the WiFi access points density, and 2) for
the game where a mobile user can choose between the ser-
vices of a licensed band operator and a SCNP, there exists a
Nash equilibrium for specific distribution of user preferences.
The Nash equilibrium characterizes the number of users that
should subscribe to each type of service. Although the au-
thors make a good study of a WSCN model, their strategies
are difficult to implement in practice, due to subscription
fee changes in different time slots. Variable fees imply the
possibility of user switching, and this might not be a reality
at present. The authors also do not consider the more ba-
sic problem of efficient router deployment and user buying
motivation, which in itself is the first step to achieving high
coverage.
Our Research Contribution
• We devise a simple to implement, successful, budget-
balanced, ex-post efficient, and individually rational auction-
based mechanism that generates the optimal number
of features a WSCN router should have, and allocates
costs to residential users in proportion to the feature
benefits they receive. Our proposed mechanism ac-
counts for heterogeneous user preferences towards dif-
ferent router features and comes up with the optimal
(feature-set, user costs) router blueprint that satisfies
each user in a locality, in turn motivating them to buy
routers and thereby improve deployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we define our problem setup. Here we state our problem
assumptions and explain mathematical notations to be used
for modeling and analysis. In Section 3, we define certain
mathematical properties of cost sharing rules used in our
ture.
auction mechanism. We propose our auction mechanism in
Section 4. We conclude our paper in Section 5.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we state our problem assumptions and
explain the mathematical notations used for modeling and
analysis.
2.1 Assumptions
A wireless social network provider (SCNP) wants to mar-
ket its business in a residential locality6 by designing and
selling routers that incorporate certain number of hardware
and software features which could form the core of next gen-
eration wireless router design. We assume here that wireless
social community networks is a new technology, and that
the SCNPs are in the process of entering the market by de-
signing their first set of multi-feature routers to meet the
needs of the locality7. Each feature is advertised for (i.e.,
through newspapers, pamphlets, etc.,) and analyzed on a
cost-benefit basis before being put into manufacture. Each
user in a given geographical locality may or may not be in-
terested in buying such routers. However, those who are in-
terested are quite keen on getting proper information about
the new technology at hand and its benefits. Given that
most civilian users are naive about upcoming technology,
they prefer to exchange information amongst the peers in
the locality by mere personal interaction or using Facebook
like social websites and gauge the societal benefit as well
as their own benefits. Typical information exchange would
include information such as 1) user costs (buying hardware
and setup costs), 2) perceived user and societal benefits, 3)
market information for newly advertised product, 4) hard-
ware (technological) information, 5) network topologies sur-
rounding the locality users, and 6) Internet service provider
(ISP) policies. In this paper, we do not deal with the mech-
anism to exchange messages through Facebook. We believe
that with the development of systems networking applica-
tions over time, efficient and secure message passing in so-
cial networks would not be an issue. Finally, we assume
that the users in a locality who are interested in buying net-
work routers are keen on societal welfare as well as their own
individual welfare.
2.2 Mathematical Notations
In this section, we define and explain the basic and major
mathematical notations that we use throughout the paper.
Specific notations pertaining to a particular section will be
discussed within the section itself.
n - number of users in a geographical locality that are in-
terested in the new multi-feature router product advertised
by an SCNP.
6A residential locality could be a residential complex like a
condominium or apartment complex of 100’s of apartments
owned by an organization. This type of residential setup is
very common in India and south-east asian countries. The
residents of a condominium share common features and may
be on interacting terms with one another.
7Each locality may result in routers with different feature
sets. However, at this juncture we assume for simplicity
that people are generally uniformly distributed with respect
to their needs, and as a result every locality will have the
same needs on average.
jbi(k) - the estimate of the joint benefit perceived by user
i of incorporating a particular feature k in the router. Each
user has its own estimate that he obtains by communicating
with its locality peers on Facebook regarding information
specified in Section 2.1. We assume that the estimate of
the joint benefit is a non-increasing function in the number
of features, i.e ., the marginal joint benefit monotonically
decreases with the increase in the number of features. As
an example, the estimated joint benefit to manufacture fea-
ture 1 is greater than or equal to the estimated joint benefit
to manufacture feature 2. This assumption is realistic as
router features generally have a sorted order of preferences
in a community w.r.t joint benefits. The estimates for each
user are known to a third party called a ‘social planner’ who
is a mediator between the SCNP and the residential users.
The estimate of the joint benefit can be considered as a mea-
sure of the overall social utility of a particular router feature
as perceived by a particular user i.
ibi(k) - user i
′s reported value of the valuation of a router
feature k. This is a users individual valuation as reported
to the social planner. It may not be equal to a user’s actual
perceived utility for a feature. As in the case of estimated
joint benefits, it is also a non-increasing function in the num-
ber of features. The reported valuation can be considered
as a measure of the reported individual utility of a particular
router feature as decided by a particular user i.
ib(k) - maximum reported valuation of router feature k.
jb(k) - perceived valuation of the user who wins the bid
for feature k.
pbi(k) - user i
′s actual value of the valuation of a router
feature k. This is a users true individual valuation, which
he does not report to the social planner. As in the case of
estimated joint benefits, it is also a non-increasing function
in the number of features. The reported valuation can be
considered as a measure of the actual individual utility of a
particular router feature as perceived by a particular user i.
We emphasize that once feature k is manufactured, pbi(k)
is the individual utility to user i.
c(k) - the cost to an SCNP to manufacture router fea-
ture k. We assume the cost to be non-decreasing in the
number of features. i.e ., the marginal manufacture cost
monotonically increases with the increase in the number of
features. As an example, the estimated cost to manufacture
feature 1 is greater than or equal to the estimated cost to
manufacture feature 2. This implies that given a sorted or-
der of feature preferences w.r.t the whole locality, it takes
an SCNP more cost to manufacture low preference features.
The assumption is realistic because the cost may not just
be manufacturing costs to build feature k but could also in-
clude costs in the form of time, prospective profits, market
impact, etc., which might reduce the level of importance of
SCNPs to manufacture low preference features.
π - a family of cost sharing rules. It is a per-feature ex-
tension of the family proposed in [4], which considers only
one feature. We explain more about cost sharing rules in
Sections 3 and 4.
ΦPF - the set of all per-feature extensions, pi.
ϕk - a per-feature proportional cost sharing rule for fea-
ture k. It is a per-feature extension of the rule proposed in
[4] for a single feature.
For modeling simplicity, we assume jbi(k), ibi(k), pbi(k),
and c(k) to have the same measurable units. This assump-
tion need not be necessarily true, and it is an important open
modeling question in cyber-economic systems to model these
parameters with the most appropriate units.
3. PROPERTIES OF COST SHARING RULES
In this section, we define the mathematical properties that
our cost sharing rules possess. The properties define the na-
ture of our cost sharing rules in light of users sharing benefits
and providers (SCNPs) expending cost to manufacture fea-
tures. We modify the properties of the family, Φ, of cost
sharing rules that were stated in [4] to account for a router
with multiple-features8. We emphasize that a feature k is
manufactured iff
∑n
i=1 pbi(k) ≥ c(k), i.e., there is no use for
a WSCN user to buy a router with feature k if the user’s ac-
tual individual utility is lesser than the cost to manufacture
feature k. Let F be the largest k such that
∑n
i=1 pbi(k) >
c(k). Then exactly F features will be manufactured. Let
pbi = (pbi(1), ....., pbi(F )) and C = (c(1), ......, c(F )). We de-
fine our cost-sharing rule over the domain DF , where DF =
{(pb1, ....., pbn) : ibi ≥ 0;
∑n
i=1 pbi(k) > c(k),∀k ≤ F}.
A per-feature extension of Φ is a mapping π defined over
DF and with range [0,
∑F
k=1 c(k)], satisfying the following
π(pb1, ....., pbn;C) =
F∑
k=1
ϕk(pb1(k), ....., pbn(k); c(k));ϕk ǫ π ∀k;
where ϕk is a cost-sharing rule in the per-feature exten-
sion family of cost sharing rules devised by Moulin et.al. in
[4]9. The per-feature monotonicity property extensions from
those in [4] are as follows.
ϕk(pbi(k); pb−i(k); c(k)) is non-increasing in pb−i(k)
and ∀λ > 0 we have
ϕk(pbi(k)−λ; pbj 6=i+λ, ..., pbn(k)) ≥ ϕk(pbi(k); pb−i(k); c(k))−λ,
where
(pb1, .., pbn) ǫD
F and pbi(k) ≥ λ
Let ΦPF be the set of per-feature extensions of Φ. The
following properties hold for any π ǫΦPF in the light of the
properties of family Φ in [4].
anonymity : π(pbi; , pb−i);C) is a symmetric function of pb−i
budget− balance :
n∑
i=1
π(pbi; pb−i;C) =
F∑
k=1
c(k)
corebounds : 0 ≤ π(pbi; pb−i;C) ≤
F∑
k=1
pbi(k)
8the authors in [4] just consider one feature.
9any cost sharing rule in the family of rules in [4] follows
monotonicity properties mentioned in [4]. In this section,
we extend the monotonicity properties mentioned in [4] to
account for multiple features.
The above mentioned properties follows directly from the
corresponding properties of all ϕ ǫΦ. In this paper, we adopt
a per-feature proportional cost sharing rule that obeys the
properties of anonymity, budget-balance, and core-bounds.
We will explain the rule amidst our auction-based mecha-
nism in Section 4.
In order to construct our auction-based mechanism, we
define an auxiliary function µk over R
n
+ in lines with the
work in [4]. We define µk by the following relations.
F1 = G1 if pbN/i(k) ≤ jbi(k);
µk(jbi(k); pb−i(k)) = 0 if pbN/i(k) > jbi(k),
where
F1 = µk(jbi(k); pb−i(k);C(k)),
G1 = ϕk(jbi(k)− pbN/i(k); pb−i(k);C(k))
In view of the monotonicity properties of ϕk, we get the
following three properties of µk for the multi-feature case
∀k = 1, ..., F .
µk is non-decreasing in jbi(k) if pbN/i > 0;
A1 ≥ B1 ≥ C1, ∀λ > 0; jbi(k) > 0;
and
D1 ≤ E1 if pbN/i < jbi(k),
where
A1 = µk(jbi(k); pb−i(k)),
B1 = µk(jbi(k); pbj 6=i(k) + λ, ....., pbn(k)),
C1 = µk(jbi(k); pb−i(k))− λ,
D1 = µk(jbi(k) + λ; pbj 6=i + λ, ...., pbn(k)),
E1 = µk(jbi(k); pb−i(k)),
jbN (k) =
n∑
i=1
jbi(k); jbN/j(k) =
∑
i6=j
jbi(k),
4. AUCTION MECHANISM
We devise a two stage universal mechanism10 for imple-
menting router deployment for public welfare. Our mecha-
nism is based on ideas by Jackson and Moulin(1992). We
aim for individual rationality, budget balance, and ex-post
efficiency without adopting the Bayesian approach to mech-
anism design. The authors in [4] do not consider Bayesian
incentive compatibility due to some impossibility theorems
in mechanism design. However, they do mention the fact
that accounting for Bayesian information about other user
preferences is a rational thing to do. We can afford to use a
non-Bayesian method in the present day due to the presence
of social websites like Facebook, via which users can get in-
formation about each others preferences much more easily
and practically without assuming beliefs about preferences.
For more details on the properties of individual rationality,
10The mechanism uses no statistical information about the
distribution of other user characteristics
budget-balance, and ex-post efficiency, the reader is referred
to [7][2]. Our auction mechanism is as follows.
Stage 1: There are n agents in a locality who are in-
terested in installing routers. Each agent i simultaneously
submit bids, Bi, for the joint benefit they estimate for incor-
porating a certain number of router features. Bi is a vector
of the form (jbi(1), ....., jbi(Gi)), where jbi(k) denotes the
joint benefit perceived by user i for incorporating the kth
feature in the router, and Gi is the optimal number of fea-
tures to be manufactured, as proposed by user i. The users
could estimate the joint benefits via messaging in Facebook.
We assume that jbi(k) is non-decreasing in k (each feature
could be in order of decreasing importance to general network
users), for each user in the residential locality.
If jbi(1) ≤ c(1) for all i, the router is not built and the
mechanism terminates. Otherwise, let the winner of the
kth feature bid jb(k), and let G be the optimal number of
features to be incorporated indicated by all the winning bids.
Proceed to Stage 2 of the mechanism.
Stage 2: Users simultaneously submit individual benefit
bids ibi(k) for each router feature k. The defining factors
at this stage of the mechanism are the number of features
each user adopts, and the cost it has to pay for its accrued
benefits. There are two types of users in the residential
locality: 1) those who do not win any bids in stage one of
the mechanism, and 2) users who win atleast one bid. Any
non-winner i’s adopted number of features kNWU is given
as
k
NWU = max{G|α ≥ β, ∀K ǫ [1, G]},
where
α =
k=G∑
k=1
[ibN (k)− jb(k)],
β =
k=K∑
k=1
[ibN (k)− jb(k)],
ibN =
∑j=n
j=1 ibj is the sum of individual benefit levels.
We term users who win atleast one bid as ‘winners’. We
denote the adopted number of features by a winner i as
kWUi , where kWUi lies within the interval [kWUi , kWU∗∗i ], if
kWUi ǫ [kWU∗i , kWU∗∗i ], and within the interval [kWUi , kWU∗i ]⋃
{kNWU}, if kNWU ǫ [kWU∗i , kWU∗∗i ], where we have the
following definition of the parameters.
k
WUi = max{0,max{k|ibN (k) > jb(k); Ii(k) = 1}}
k
WU∗i = max{0,max{k|ibN (k) ≥ jb(k); Ii(k) = 1}}
k
WU∗∗i = min{G,min{k − 1|k > kWU∗i ; Ii(k) = 1}}
Ii(k) is an index function which takes a value 1 if user i wins
the kth unit and 0 otherwise.
An important part of our mechanism is cost allocation.
We now describe the cost allocation mechanism for the users
in the residential locality. This is done by a social network
planner, who could be one amongst the locality, or be a third
party who works in consultation with the SCNP to properly
allocate costs according to the benefits accrued by the users.
A non-winner i pays
γ − δ,
where
γ =
k=kNWU∑
k=1
µk(ib(k), ib−i(k)),
δ =
k=G∑
k=kNWU+1
[ib(k)− ibN/i(k)− µk(ib(k), ib−i(k))]
The first part of the payment expression denotes amount
of features adopted by the winner, whereas the second part
is the amount of compensation received from other users in
the network. The compensation could be in the form of de-
ductions to the monthly bill that would have arrived without
the compensations. The compensations resembles the price
of overbidding in the first stage of the game mechanism.
A winner who atleast wins one bid in Stage 1 pays
α1 + α2− α3 + α4,
where
α1 =
∑
kǫLS
i
[c(k)−
∑
jǫN/i
µk(ib(k), ib−j(k))],
α2 =
∑
k 6∈LS
i
; k≤kWUi
µk(ib(k), ib−i(k)),
α3 =
∑
kǫ (kWUi ,G); k 6∈LF
i
[ib(k)− ibN/i − µk(ib(k), ib−i(k))],
α4 =
∑
kǫLF
i
[
∑
jǫN/i
[ib(k)− ibN/j(k)− µk(ib(k), ib−j(k))]],
where we have LSi , L
F
i defined as
L
S
i = {k|k ≤ k
WUi , Ii(k) = 1; ibN ≥ ib(k)}
L
F
i = {k|Ii(k) = 1; k 6∈ L
S
i }
We note that the first part of the pay of user i is its cost-
share as a winner and the second part is its cost share as
a non-winner. The third part is the compensation received
as a non-winner and the fourth part is the fine that the
user pays. The µ function is a family of auxiliary functions
that we define over Rn+ which define the cost allocation
rules of the social planner and satisfies budget balance and
individual rationality.
We summarize the result of this paper via the following
theorem.
Theorem. At every sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
in undominated strategies, 1) the router is supplied by the
SCNP with the optimal number of features, 2) the costs
amongst the users are distributed according to a proportional
cost sharing mechanism which is successful, budget-balanced,
ex-post efficient, and individually rational, 3) the highest
first stage bids equals the correct joint benefit, and 4) the
second stage bids reveal a user’s true valuation for each fea-
ture.
Proof. The proof of the above theorem follows from the
following four lemmas, the proofs of which are in the Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 1. A non-winner has a unique dominant strategy
to report its individual valuations for each feature truthfully.
Lemma 2. A winner has a dominant strategy to report
truthfully on its non-winning features.
Lemma 3. Given that no user uses a weakly dominated
strategy and that Lemmas 1 and 2 hold strictly, the best bid-
ding strategy for any winner i is: 1) ∀k such that Ii(k) = 0,
ib
optimal
i (k) = pb
k
i and 2)∀k such that Ii(k) = 1, ib
optimal
i (k) =
max{0, jb(k)− pbN/j(k)}.
Lemma 4. In stage 1 of our auction mechanism game,
user i′s optimal bid for feature k is given by iboptimali (k),
which lies in the interval [0, ib−i(k)) if ib−i(k) ≥ pbN(k) and
k ≤ F , and is equal to max{c(k), ib−i(k)} + ǫ if ib−i(k) ≥
pbN(k). Here ǫ is the smallest increment allowed and F =
max{k|pbN(k) > c(k). A user does not bid for the kth fea-
ture if k > F .
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed an universal, two-stage,
auction-based mechanism to catalyze efficient deployment
of multi-feature routers in a wireless social community net-
work. Our mechanism is simple-to-implement, successful,
budget-balanced, ex-post efficient and individually rational.
Our proposed mechanism accounts for heterogeneous user
preferences towards different router features and comes up
with the optimal (feature-set, user costs) router blueprint
that satisfies each user in a locality. Our work takes an im-
portant step towards motivating community users in buying
WSCN routers and in turn contributing to the increase in
mobile and ubiquitous wireless WiFi coverage and QoS im-
provement.
6. APPENDIX
In this section, we prove the theorem stated in Section IV.
Our proof is divided into four parts in the form of lemmas.
The statement of the theorem follows from the four lemmas.
Lemma 1. A non-winner has a unique dominant strategy
to report its individual valuations for each feature truthfully.
Proof. A non-winner j affects its payoff via kNWU . Given
ib−j of other agents and the winning bids (jb(1), ...., jb(k))
in stage 1 of the auction mechanism, kNWU is a function of
ibj = (ibj(1), ......ibj (k). We get three scenarios to deal with:
1. kNWU (ibj) = k
NWU (pbj), where pbj = (pbj(1), ......pbj(k),
2. kNWU (ibj) < k
NWU (pbj), and 3. k
NWU (ibj) > k
NWU (pbj).
In scenario 1, a user is indifferent between reporting ibj and
pbj . In scenario 2, by reporting ibj , user j gets an utility of
Uj(ibj) = P1−P2+P3, where P1 =
∑k=kNWU (ibj)
k=1 pbj(k),
P2 =
∑k=kNWU (ibj)
k=1 µk(ibj(k), ib−j(k)), and P3 is equal to∑k=G
k=kNWU (ibj)+1
[ib(k) − ibN/j(k) − µk(ib(k), ib−j(k))]. By
reporting pbj , user j gets an utility of Uj(pbj) = P1
′ −
P2′ + P3′, where P1′ =
∑k=kNWU (pbj)
k=1 pbj(k), P2
′ is equal
to
∑k=kNWU (pbj)
k=1 µk(ibj(k), ib−j(k)), and P3
′ is equal to
∑k=G
k=kNWU (pbj)+1
[ib(k) − ibN/j(k) − µk(ib(k), ib−j(k))]. We
know thatmax{G|
∑k=G
k=1 [pbj(k)+ibN/j(k)−jb(k)] ≥
∑k=K
k=1 [pbj(k)+
ibN/j(k) − jb(k)],∀K ǫ [1, G]}.Thus, Uj(ibj) − Uj(pbj) ≥ 0.
Therefore, in scenario 2, an user prefers a truthful report pbj
to a report ibj . In case of scenario 3, Uj(ibj) − Uj(pbj) =
∑k=kNWU (pbj )
k=kNWU (pbj )+1
[pbj(k)+ ibN/j(k)− jb(k)]. We again know
thatmax{G|
∑k=G
k=1 [pbj(k)+ibN/j(k)−jb(k)] ≥
∑k=K
k=1 [pbj(k)+
ibN/j(k)−jb(k)],∀K ǫ [1, G]}.Thus, Uj(ibj)−Uj(pbj) ≤ 0.Therefore,
in scenario 3, an user prefers a truthful report pbj to a re-
port ibj . 
Lemma 2. A winner has a dominant strategy to report
truthfully on its non-winning features.
Proof. We divide user i’s report into two parts: user i’s
report on its winning units and non-winning units repre-
sented as a pair (ib
WU
i , ib
NWU
i ). Let (pb
WU
i , pb
NWU
i ) denote
a user’s true benefit from its winning and non-winning units.
We claim that any report of the form (ib
WU
i , ib
NWU
i ) such
that ib
NWU
i 6= pb
NWU
i is weakly dominated by the strategy
(ib
WU
i , pb
NWU
i ). Given k
WUi , user i’s cost share is inde-
pendent on its non-winning features (ib
NWU
i ). (ib
NWU
i ) can
only influence kWUi through kNWU . There are three cases to
deal with: 1. when kNWU (pb
NWU
i ) 6∈ (k
WU∗i , kWU∗∗i), user
i′s choice interval will not improve by manipulating its re-
port on its non-winning units ib
NWU
i . When k
NWU (pb
NWU
i ) ∈
(kWU∗i , kWU∗∗i ], and kNWU (ib
NWU
i ) 6∈ (k
WU∗i , kWU∗∗i ],
we can easily prove by contradiction that user i′s optimal
choice ofKWUi is not in (kWU∗i , kNWU (pb
NWU
i ))
⋃
(kNWU (pb
NWU
i ), k
WU∗∗i ].
In the third case, when kNWU (pb
NWU
i ) ∈ (k
WU∗i , kWU∗∗i ],
and kNWU (ib
NWU
i ) ∈ (k
WU∗i , kWU∗∗i ], it can be easily shown
on the lines of case 2 that Ui(k
NWU (pb
NWU
i )) ≥ Ui(k
NWU (ib
NWU
i )).
Thus, a report (ib
WU
i , pb
NWU
i ) weakly dominates [1] any
other report (ib
WU
i , ib
NWU
i ) such that pb
NWU
i 6= ib
NWU
i ).

Lemma 3. Given that no user uses a weakly dominated
strategy and that Lemmas 1 and 2 hold strictly, the best bid-
ding strategy for any winner i is: 1) ∀k such that Ii(k) = 0,
ib
optimal
i (k) = pb
k
i and 2)∀k such that Ii(k) = 1, ib
optimal
i (k) =
max{0, jb(k)− pbN/j(k)}.
Proof. We emphasize that needs to know only the joint
benefit for each feature to evaluate its best response. The
first part of the best reply is proved as a dominant strat-
egy in Lemma 2. For any user i′s winning features, if
ib
optimal
i (k) > jb(k) − pbN/j(k), i gets the feature and pays
c(k) −
∑
jǫN/i µk(ib(k), ib−j(k))] for it. We observe that
user i′s payment is non-decreasing in iboptimali (k). Thus,
if user i would like to consume at least k units, the best
report on the kth unit is max{0, jb(k) − pbN/j(k)}. Now if
ib
optimal
i (k) ≤ jb(k) − pbN/j(k), irrespective of the number
of features user i adopts, he needs to pay a fine for the kth
feature, which amounts to ib(k)− ibN/i−µk(ib(k), ib−i(k)).
This fine is non-increasing in iboptimali (k). Thus a user can
minimize its fine by reporting max{0, jb(k) − pbN/j(k)}.
Thus, irrespective of whether user i adopts feature k, its
best reply is max{0, jb(k)− pbN/j(k)}. 
Lemma 4. In stage 1 of our auction mechanism game,
user i′s optimal bid for feature k is given by iboptimali (k),
which lies in the interval [0, ib−i(k)) if ib−i(k) ≥ pbN(k) and
k ≤ F , and is equal to max{c(k), ib−i(k)} + ǫ if ib−i(k) ≥
pbN(k). Here epsilon is the smallest increment allowed and
F = max{k|pbN(k) > c(k). A user does not bid for the kth
feature if k > F .
Proof. The proof follows easily from the analysis of stage
1 in [4].
The proof of the theorem follows from the above lemmas.
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